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Applying the Reason Model 
to enhance health record 
research in the age of ‘big data’
Rajan Ragupathy, Vithya Yogarajan
There is considerable international interest in applying powerful data re-search techniques (‘big data’) to health 
records.1 This will become increasingly 
viable in New Zealand as previously siloed 
records held by private primary providers 
and public secondary institutions become 
accessible at the regional level—such as 
through the Midland Clinical Portal—and 
perhaps eventually even at the national 
level. Such research could, for instance, un-
cover the real-world safety and effectiveness 
of new health technologies, identify health 
disparities or optimise application of inter-
national guidelines in New Zealand.
However, such research opportunities will 
only be viable if the public can trust that 
patient confi dentiality will be protected. 
Similarly, providers would rightly be wary 
of making records available for research 
if doing so might breach legal and ethical 
obligations, such as those in the Health and 
Disability Consumers’ Code of Rights and 
the Health Information Privacy Code. We 
propose here a framework—drawing from 
patient safety methods in healthcare and 
‘big data’ safeguards already in use in New 
Zealand—for protecting the confi dentiality 
of health records in research. 
Many health professionals will be familiar 
with the Reason Model of patient safety. 
This model posits that any safeguard against 
patient harm will inevitably have holes in it, 
due to system design limitations and human 
factors. These holes are constantly opening 
and closing, creating opportunities for an 
error to bypass the safeguard. It is therefore 
necessary to have multiple adaptive safe-
guards and continuous learning to prevent 
an error reaching the patient.2
Health professionals may be less familiar 
with the safeguards used by Statistics New 
Zealand’s Integrated Data Infrastructure 
(IDI).3 The IDI allows ‘big data’ techniques 
to be applied to linked datasets that contain 
information about (among other things) 
New Zealanders’ income, certain health 
interventions, educational outcomes, 
housing, use of Government benefi ts and 
social services, and interactions with the 
criminal justice system. Multiple safe-
guards—known as ‘the fi ve safes’—protect 
the confi dentiality of this information.4 Each 
of the ‘safes’ are detailed below, along with 
their applicability to protecting confi denti-
ality in health record research.
Safe people
Researchers are referee checked and 
must sign a declaration of secrecy under 
the Statistics Act 1975 before accessing 
data in the IDI.4 This can be replicated in 
the health sector through confi dentiality 
agreements, employment contracts and 
professional codes of practice. However, as 
cases of health professionals inappropri-
ately accessing patient records (‘employee 
browsing’) have shown, such measures may 
not fully protect against human nature.5
Safe projects
Statistics New Zealand requires the 
Government Statistician (or a delegated 
person) to sign off all research projects as 
being in the public interest, and not compro-
mising individual privacy.4 However, there 
is currently no single standardised pathway 
for signing off data research projects in 
the health sector. The National Ethics 
Advisory Committee’s Ethical Guidelines 
for Observational Studies provide guidance 
for investigators and institutional review 
boards, but allow considerable scope for 
determining whether projects needs to be 
reviewed by the Health and Disability Ethics 
Committee (HDEC).6 It has also been argued 
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that the current HDEC review process is 
tailored for interventional research, and 
may not be ideal for considering the risks of 
data research.7 Institutional review boards 
such as those at universities or DHBs may 
face similar or even greater limitations. 
We strongly endorse calls to strengthen 
the review process with expertise in data 
science, a public registry of projects and a 
detailed pathway for approval.7
Safe settings
Statistics New Zealand uses a secure 
Data Lab environment to release data to 
researchers, with designated non-networked 
computers from which Statistics New 
Zealand staff control the release.4 It may 
not be fi nancially or logistically feasible to 
replicate this in the health sector. However, 
a corresponding safeguard may include a set 
of universally agreed encryption and cyber-
security protocols that researchers must be 
validated against before accessing health 
records. (Encryption keys should be kept 
secure and regularly updated to conform to 
current encryption best practices). If data is 
to be stored ‘in the cloud’ at any point in this 
process, there should be transparency about 
where the cloud servers are located, who 
else may be accessing the data and (in cases 
where the servers or cloud providers are 
based overseas) which nations may be able 
to assert jurisdiction. 
Safe data
Statistics New Zealand de-identifi es data 
before releasing it to researchers. However, 
de-identifi cation of health records may 
be more challenging due to the wealth of 
potentially identifying information in health 
records, especially those of a longitudinal 
nature. The United States Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA) 
Privacy Rule sets what is arguably the gold 
standard in health record de-identifi cation, 
and lists 18 different categories of personal 
information that must be removed before 
a record is considered de-identifi ed.8 The 
HIPPA requirements could be considered 
equivalent to the standard in the Health 
Information Privacy Code that information 
does not identify an individual.9 This 
makes the de-identifi cation of records in 
New Zealand equally challenging. Manual 
de-identifi cation of health records requires 
specially trained staff who also have medical 
knowledge, is laborious and is potentially 
very expensive. Automated de-identifi cation 
is still an unsolved problem and has not yet 
achieved the 95% threshold needed (across 
all 18 HIPPA categories) for a record to be 
considered de-identifi ed.10,11
Safe outputs
Statistics New Zealand sets standards 
for research outputs to ensure individuals 
cannot be identifi ed. This could be repli-
cated by universally agreed standards 
for outputs that researchers must agree 
to before gaining access to the data. It is 
important here to consider not just the fi nal 
outputs (such as reports and publications) 
but also intermediate outputs (such as data 
collated into a spreadsheet for analysis). The 
accidental release of such a document could 
result in a major privacy breach.12
In summary, there are a number of 
potential hurdles to be overcome to fully 
unlock the potential of health record 
research in New Zealand. Instead of either 
putting such research in the ‘too-hard’ 
basket, or alternatively allowing a set of 
ad-hoc and potentially variable standards to 
develop, we urge cautious progress through 
a set of universally agreed safeguards that 
benefi t patients, providers and researchers. 
These also concord with proposed ethical 
frameworks for data research: public 
interest, trust and transparency.7
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